Teddy Kennedy's Despairing Report from Saigon, Pps. 4-5

That's Not Restlessness—It's Fear of Shipwreck

"Tonight our nation is accomplishing more for its people than has ever been accomplished before. . . . Yet there is in the land a certain restlessness. . . . Why? . . . Because when a great ship cuts through the sea, the waters are always stirred and troubled. . . ."

—Johnson's State of the Union Message Jan. 17

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The Menace We Face In Asia Is Really Our Own

Instead of making national policy from "hand to mouth," i.e. from crisis to crisis, it might be well to stand back and look at the Pueblo affair in longer and sobering perspective. This warning bell should remind us, first of all, that we are involved in a series of Asian civil wars, and that this involvement is in each case a blank check on our manpower and resources that any one of five Asian satellites may decide to cash in this or a similar flareup at any time. Our national credit, honor or prestige will make it very difficult not to pay up when called. The blank checks are held, in the order of their issuance, by the South Koreans, by Chiang Kai-shek, by the South Vietnamese, by the Royal Laotian regime and by the Thais. Added up, these blank checks could involve us in war with close to a billion people, 10,000 miles away, spread over an area about a fourth larger than the continental United States. War on such a scale would cripple our country even if in the end we "won."

The Other Side's Blank Checks

The "domino effect" which should worry us is the fact that once these blank checks are cashed on our side, their counterparts may be cashed on the other. North Korea, for example, holds blank checks on both Moscow and Peking in the shape of 10-year treaties signed in July, 1961, which pledge both to give North Korea full military and financial aid. So long as fighting is confined to Southeast Asia, only the borderlands of China are affected. But North Korea has a common border with the U.S.S.R. and it took some stern efforts by Truman last time to keep the Korean war from spilling over into Soviet territory and setting off a World War. Now is the time to think about these blank checks. It will be too late when they are called.

The only wise policy is to begin to disengage now from Asia. It is a huge quicksand. The danger of being sucked into it irrevocably is heightened by the character of our satellites. In every case they are big on talk but poor on delivery. The three main satellites, at Taipei, Seoul and Saigon, are all opposed to any compromise, and loudly committed to reconquest of their respective rival territories—as long as we do the fighting. They are the most arrogant poor relations in the world. Though all three of them have already failed in the test of war, though all three run police states which would collapse without U.S. support, though the ruling classes in all three enrich themselves at our expense, they all feel that these Asian tails can wag the U.S. dog because of our anti-Communist obsessions. We're like a drunken sailor being steered to clip joints by Oriental sharpies.

The South Korean regime is acting up in just this way in the Pueblo affair. "South Korea Urges 'Stern' U.S. Action" said a *Washington Post* headline over a disptach from Seoul by Richard Halloran Jan. 26. "South Koreans," Halloran wrote, "often remind Americans that South Korea did not sign the 1953 armistice." Next day he reported, "There is much sentiment here for a drive to the Yalu river on the Manchurian border to eliminate the North Korean regime." This is a useful time to recall that neither Diem nor any of his successors ever accepted the terms of the 1954 Geneva armistice in Vietnam and that Diem's U.S. military advisers, like Syngman Rhee's in South Korea before the last Korean war, were sure that their protege armies were the best in Asia and would mop up their northern rivals in no time in any test. Rhee and his military also talked big about marching to the Yalu but were pushed back to Pusan at the very southern tip of Korea in a few days when war came in 1950.

Few commentators have stopped to notice that South Korea has three times as many people as North Korea and that its armed forces (612,000) are more than half again as large as North Korea's (368,000). Yet Kim Il Sung accounted it a

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Clark Clifford and the Battle of Khesanh

When Clark Clifford left the White House in 1950, the then Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, sent a letter to several dozen leading U.S. corporations proposing that they give Clifford a retainer as Washington counsel. One large corporation, to which Johnson suggested $10,000 a year, promptly agreed to that amount. This was the beginning of Clifford's career as Washington handyman, lobbyist or consultant. Louis Johnson, resigning himself later that year, sent around a similar letter on his own behalf and set up shop in the same way. One cannot imagine McNamara or Charlie Wilson thus "passing the hat" among the very corporations with whom they do or did business from the Pentagon, but this hitherto untold story will shock no one in the morally corrupted Washington establishment. This was the beginning of Clifford's metamorphosis from a Truman liberal to an affluent nexus between the military-industrial complex and the gov-

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political triumph to get the Chinese armies out of North Korea as early as 1958 while South Korea insists that we keep U.S. troops on its territory. We have 50,000 there now and we'll need at least 10 times that number if the Korean war flares up again.

North Korea's Progress

If our propaganda were true, the North Korean regime should have collapsed long ago. When the war ended, our bombers had literally left no productive facilities standing in North Korea. The country was wholly devastated. Yet it has made a miraculous comeback; Che Guevara once told me that nothing in his tour of the Soviet bloc so impressed him as the economic reconstruction in North Korea and the quality of its industrial products. Even Harry Schwartz, the Soviet bloc expert of the *New York Times* recognizes (Jan. 29) the "very impressive strides" which have made north Korea "one of the most industrialized countries of Asia."

There is no sign that the South has in any way matched that achievement despite the hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. aid. The magnitude of that aid, the supposed advantages of "free enterprise" and the difference in population should have more than compensated for the South's relative poverty in coal and iron. Our propaganda agencies have begun to crank out the same line they used in Vietnam, that the North is preparing to invade the South because the economic progress in the South had made the North despair of subverting it peacefully. But I have before me a clipping from the *Korea Times* of Seoul for Jan. 7 which reports a nationwide opinion poll conducted by the South Korean Ministry of Public Information. People were asked whether they felt there had been any improvement in their daily life in the past two years. Less than a third (31.2%) thought it improved and even they only answered "slightly better." This, from a government poll in the government-controlled press of Seoul!

In so unstable a situation, the military must be ready for trouble and getting ready may itself set it off. The Pueblo incident may be an accident, but such accidents are sooner or later inevitable. Some conception of the realities off the East coast of North Korea may easily be obtained by putting the charges of their military and ours side by side. Their radio charges a large number of intrusions into their territorial waters by South Korean and U.S. vessels. The Pentagon charges repeated instances in which our ships have been

And Isn't Hot Pursuit What We Claim the Right To Practice in Cambodia?

"There has been no absolute denial by American sources that at some earlier stage during that night the Pueblo might not have been sailing within North Korean territorial waters. If she was, there can be no outright assumption that North Korea was acting illegally, since the principle of pursuit from inside to outside her territorial waters could be held to apply."

—The Times *(London) January 25*

"harassed" in the same waters. Obviously there has been much close and hostile naval contact in the area. The simplest explanation why no aid was sent the Pueblo is because (as explained in a Pentagon backgrounder in the *New York Times* Jan. 25 by Wm. Beecher):

There have been many cases of North Korean harassment of intelligence ships, according to this account, so neither the skipper of the Pueblo, Comdr. Lloyd M. Bucher, nor Air Force and Navy commanders expected any attempt to seize the vessel. Such ships are often buzzed by aircraft, photographed by helicopters and closely approached by gunboats of other nations not only off Korea but in many parts of the world.

Another reason the Pueblo might have felt secure is that the North Koreans have no vessel to match her. This little 906-ton ship "would become the largest vessel in the North Korean Navy if her captors carried out their threat to keep her." (UPI from Washington in *New York Times,* Jan. 25). Navy records list nothing larger in the North Korean Navy than two 540-ton minesweepers. Indeed the *Washington Star* (Jan. 25) reported a Pentagon backgrounder in which the question of reprisals was discussed. One proposal was to seize a comparable ship in the North Korean Navy but this was dropped because there was none in it anywhere near that big. Maybe one way to solve the crisis would be to give North Korea as U.S. military aid a ship big enough to make its seizure worthwhile.

The Johnson Administration, according to a Washington dispatch in the *New York Times* Jan. 29 is "confident that it has a strong legal case" in the capture of the Pueblo. If it is so certain, the civilized thing to do would be to offer to submit the case to an impartial international board of arbitration satisfactory to both sides. It is possible that the U.S.

The Wall St. Journal Debunks LBJ's Reliance On Business For Job Training

"Last year I directed the Secretary of Labor to bring together in one unified effort all the various manpower and related programs which could help these people in the worst areas of some of our major cities and in the countryside. The Concentrated Employment Program was established for this purpose. . . . Encouraged by our test program and by the progress that American industry has made in similar efforts, we should now press forward. . . . To launch this program I have called on American industry to establish a National Alliance of Businessmen."

—Johnson message Jan. 23 on job training program

"The fact is that these grandly publicized endeavors have failed. . . . The response of American business has been a deep and surprising disappointment to Federal manpower administrators. . . . The goal of that program, aimed at 19 urban slums and two rural backwaters, was to put '25,000 to 40,000 people in jobs' within six months, and to employ 100,000 to 150,000 more in an additional 50 areas during the current fiscal year, Secretary Wirtz explained [last March 15]. . . . Nine months after its enactment the Concentrated Employment Program had provided jobs for 6,900 persons, according to a Labor Department summary as of Dec. 15. 'Most' of the 6,900 jobs are in industry, officials say, though they provide no breakdown. . . .

"Private industry's disappointing response is most glaringly evident in examining the 12,025 other people still enrolled in some kind of job training as of Dec. 15. Exactly 552 of these were in on-the-job training for a private employer. In Pittsburgh, home of big steel, there were just seven. Oakland had 8—which was 8 more than there were in the nation's biggest city, with the nation's biggest slums. In New York there were none."

—LBJ's Job Plan: Failure Warmed Over, by James P. Gannon in the Wall Street Journal *Jan. 22.*

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does have a good legal case if one looks only at the spot where the Pueblo was first hailed.* That may indeed have been outside North Korea's 12-mile limits. But we doubt whether the U.S. would have a good legal case if the wider circumstances were subjected to such an inquiry. The government has yet to state categorically that the Pueblo did not intrude earlier into North Korea's territorial water. These spy ships tend to zig-zag in and out of territorial waters because they cannot get into the necessary visual range of coastal radar installations without approaching more closely to shore. They cannot "spook" the installations unless they come close.

Is There A Right to Spy?

Beyond that lies a broader question. Has a big power any *right* to spy out the defense installations of a small power whether from the skies or the seas? Can legal limits applicable to fisheries, commercial traffic or peaceful passage also cover such hostile activities? If North Korea had a fleet of bombers and sent out electronic ships to spy out the radar defenses of San Francisco or New York from offshore in preparations for attack, would we leave them alone just because they kept outside our territorial limits of three miles? Or would we claim that self-defense gave us a right to stop their activities?

For citizens of Wonsan, these activities off its shores must raise terrifying memories. On March 29, 1951, a U.S. Admiral revealed that a naval task force had been bombarding Wonsan for 41 days and nights "the longest sustained naval or air bombardment of a city in history." Rear Admiral Allen E. Smith exulted, "In Wonsan you cannot walk in the streets. You cannot sleep anywhere in the 24 hours, unless it is the sleep of death." (Paris ed. *NY Herald Tribune* March 30, 1951). For Russia and America, such spying and counter-spying are only an electronic extension of mutual deterrence. For a small power it seems a prelude to devastating attack. Do big powers have the right so to undermine the defenses of small powers just because the big powers can afford such expensive electronic devices?

For the American people, this raises disturbing questions. If one of our naval vessels is caught in this kind of cruel, unfair and dirty business, do we let ourselves be drawn into war over it, or do we keep our shirts on and try by patient negotiation (and if necessary apology) to recover the poor chaps we have sent out on this errand? Nothing could be

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*** Reuters from Tokyo in the New York Times Jan. 27 reported the Washington correspondent of Sankei Shimbun informed it that the North Korean radio on Jan. 9 warned the Pueblo action would be taken against it if its intelligence activities were continued. On checking, however, we found this report untrue. The text of the North Korean broadcast warned that action would be taken if U.S. spy ship intrusions continued but did not mention the Pueblo by name. The Washington correspondent of Sankei Shimbun told us the reference to the Pueblo was inserted in his dispatch by error in Tokyo. In addition, from the best we could learn, the Pueblo was not in those waters two weeks earlier. —IFS**

Those Dirty Little Devious Reds

"Two young U.S. Marines told today of two weeks of captivity by the North Vietnamese, who, they said, tried to be friendly. . . . The catalogue of enemy kindnesses included, they said, the gift of a Gideon Bible, cigarettes, cookies, vitamin pills and a water-buffalo steak and medical treatment for their bleeding and infected feet. In fact, on the march, North Vietnamese soldiers gave them their own shoes to wear, they said. The Marines said they were not pressed for information. The only hint of propagandizing came when they were asked to read pamphlets of the National Liberation Front. *In a war that is often fought without quarter by both sides, such treatment suggested to some observers that the marines' escape might have been permitted so that they might return to tell their story.*" [Emphasis added.]

—Tom Buckley, Danang, New York Times *Jan 27*

How fortunate "some observers" are available to wash our brains clear of any subversive suggestion there might be human kindness on the other side. Couldn't we appeal to the UN Security Council against this diabolic failure to mistreat our men?

An Army Expert In Guerrilla War Sees A New Vietnam Developing In Our Ghettoes

'During the next few years organized urban insurrection could explode to the extent that portions of large American cities could become scenes of destruction approaching those of Stalingrad in World War II. . . .

"While application of pure military firepower would be a poor solution, political efforts might prove not much better. There are measures that offer a better solution if we are to keep our cities from becoming battlegrounds: penetration by police intelligence, application of military intelligence, and reliance on traditional FBI methods. Such efforts must begin now. . . .

"Furthermore, there will also be needed among the well established political-tactical-military informants those who can help guide troops and police through the maze of buildings, stair-wells, streets, alleyways, tunnels, and sewers that may be the key to tactical success. In the countryside we would call this elementary or 'grass roots' intelligence; in the city there will be a similar need. . . .

"Such cement-and-brick 'jungles' can offer better security to snipers and city guerrillas than the Viet Cong enjoy in their jungles, elephant grass and marshes. This suggests protracted warfare of a very new kind if city guerrilla forces become well organized by dissident and determined leaders. . . .

"Urban riot has been established as an instrument of racial rebellion. But the riots have not been strictly one of Negroes clashing with whites; often the rioters were relieving their frustrations at their ghetto surroundings and relative poverty, and upon authorities. It is important to remember this, especially where it pertains to slums. Violence in the future may even be by whites protesting against poverty and their environment. White or black, here is where the political aspect looms large because communist elements can penetrate urban America and foment serious trouble. . . .

" 'Fight for something' is an old American tradition. Any time hence, people in a large slum in a congested metropolitan area could fight guerrilla fashion for their own local aims. They might not be fighting the federal government, but merely the city or the state. As in Vietnam today, the fighters by night could be workers by day. . . .

"From a military standpoint, successful warfare against urban-based guerrillas in American cities could be as difficult and prolonged as the fighting in Vietnam if the insurrection is well organized."

—Col. Robert Rigg in Army Magazine January 1968

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Teddy Kennedy's Despairing Report on His Latest Trip to Vietnam

Abridged from Senator Edward M. Kennedy's address Jan. 25 to the World Affairs Council of Boston:

One left Saigon in 1965 feeling things were going to get better, simply because they could not get worse. I left with the hope that some real progress was on the horizon. On my return this year from Vietnam, I am forced to report that continued optimism cannot be justified. I found that the kind of war we are fighting in Vietnam will not gain our long-range objectives; that the pattern of destruction we are creating can only make a workable political future more difficult; and that the government we are supporting has given us no indication it can win the confidence of its own people.

Some in Luxury, Some in Tombs

Saigon has grown over the past three years by almost two million people. The contrasts there are painful. A small, privileged segment of Vietnamese society is thriving. But those who have been driven in from the countryside and must now live in the streets and the hovels present a different picture. Vietnam is a nation in which reverence for the dead is the highest trait of character. Yet I saw people in Saigon who are forced to live in graveyards, and have even hollowed out tombs to find shelter. This is a city where thousands of young men 18 and 19 years old flash about the streets on their motorbikes, wearing cowboy hats and leather gloves, exempt from the war. Yet this is also a city where 40 per cent of the death toll is accounted for by children under two years of age, children killed primarily by dysentery or pneumonia.

From the air, Vietnam is a beautiful land, but when you descend from the sky you see clearly the pockmarks of war, and when you walk through the villages you see the ravages of war in the faces of the sick and wounded children. Beyond the villages abandoned fields stretch to the horizon, and scorched outlines of houses burned to the ground sometimes cover more than half the land area of a province. Whole areas which have been bulldozed to the ground are commonplace, and so are wide corridors of defoliated forests, and fields that once produced food. Here and there are compounds of long sheds with shiny tin roofs—the refugee camps where thousands upon thousands of people have been herded together, uprooted from all they ever knew or wanted.

I had the opportunity to visit more than 25 refugee camps and talk to hundreds of their people. We tend to think of refugees as a small minority of people who have been caught in a passing conflict. But when I discuss the refugees in Vietnam, I am talking about literally 25 per cent of that nation's population, all of whom are disaffected, all of whom hold a strong resentment for whatever side tore them away from the simplicity of their lives to the squalor and the bureaucracy of the camps. I found a great deal of resentment toward the United States among these people. The vast majority—I would judge over 80 per cent—claimed they were either deposited in camps by the Americans or fled to camps in fear of American airplanes and artillery. Only a handful claimed they were driven from their homes by the Viet Cong. The French, one leader told me, committed many sins in Vietnam. But the French did not wipe out their villages, or burn down their homes, or herd them into enclosures.

One further impression—and perhaps the strongest and most depressing—is the impression of the Viet Cong themselves. The Viet Cong are driven by a belief in the rightness of their cause that comes from years of colonial rule and injustice inflicted by passing governments. This belief has grown strong on a sense of nationalism carefully nurtured and

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Heroes Abroad But (Negro) Bums At Home?

"From time immemorial there has been nobody to do the fighting except the flower of our manhood. But we still can't condone their crimes in the street."

—Mrs. Richard Hughes, wife of New Jersey's Governor, replying at the White House to Eartha Kitt's anti-war protest, Washington Evening Star, *Jan. 19.*

Clifford's Talents Would Be Valuable If Johnson Moved Toward Negotiation

(Continued from Page One)

ernment. To the credit of newspaper business, his lucrative associations, including the names of the biggest like the du Ponts, RCA and General Electric, have been published. Usually such matters are left to Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson but this time they could be read in a brilliant unsigned portrait in the New York Times Jan. 20, in a dispatch by Marquis W. Childs in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch Jan. 21 (the most important paper in Clifford's home state of Missouri) and in two admirable personality sketches by Richard Harwood in the Washington Post and by Patrick Anderson in the New York Times Magazine Jan. 28.

From the standpoint of the military-industrial complex and its allies in Congress, the hated McNamara has been replaced with one of their own. Clifford is a hard-liner from way back; he helped to formulate the Truman Doctrine. From Johnson's standpoint, he will have in the Pentagon a man on whom he can utterly rely, whether in widening the war or (if he chooses) in the politically perilous task of trying by negotiation to work his way out. Clifford's popularity on the Hill and his personal gifts as a supersmoothie would be immensely valuable in any such attempt. So would the fact that Clifford is primarily a man of politics and not of ideology; a shrewd manipulator of things-as-they-are and not a fanatic.

It is this which lends added interest to Clifford's appearance Jan. 25 before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He stroked all the hawks (except Thurmond) the right way, down to a friendly reference to the need for a new bomber. But he also for the first time set forth in clear language a negotiating position which begins to offer some hope. Under it the other side could "continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions, men to South Vietnam" after our bombing had ceased. This is very different from Rusk's formula that Hanoi stop its "half of the war" if we stopped the bombing. We are reprinting what Clifford said in a box on the next page.

Hanoi wants the bombing stopped unconditionally but must know resumption would be inevitable if it followed by stepping up the war. Surely a tacit understanding along these lines is possible while peace talks begin. In this perspective, the battle building up around Khesanh as we go to press must seem a part of the bargaining. How much is "normal" supply? How much is the cessation of bombing worth to the other side if it can, despite our bombing, not only continue its economic life and furnish the few tons a day needed by the guerrillas but mount what Westmoreland calls a "sizeable invasion" around Khesanh?

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Why Saigon's Corruptionists Think They Can Do As They Please

(Continued from Page Four)

by communist political cadres. It is true that their forces have been depleted by our weapons; in the Delta, we are capturing 14 and 15 year old boys. But it is just as true that in the past six months there has been more enemy activity in that area than there was when the Viet Cong were at the height of their strength. I believe the people we are fighting for do not fully have their hearts in the struggle.

We are losing 9,000 lives and spending $30 billion a year. But Saigon—faced with an enemy which controls more than half of its land area—has yet to declare a state of national mobilization. Half of the American boys fighting in Vietnam are draftees. But in Saigon, it is common knowledge that a young man can buy his way out of the draft, or if he is in service can buy his release.

Indifference to Civilian Victims

South Vietnam's civilians who have been injured as a result of the war are victims of the same lack of concern. Each year 150,000 civilians are wounded in the war, and more than 25,000 are killed. Only 150 Vietnamese doctors are available to treat these civilian casualties, and they must also serve the entire population of over 13 million. And yet I learned, in discussions with members of the government, that they plan to divert many of this meager number by drafting more doctors into the military.

There are those who say that such a lack of compassion is normal in a continent which has seen so much suffering for so many centuries. In matters such as this, they maintain, we must make allowances for the Asian mind. But I visited more than twenty provincial hospitals and dispensaries. I entered pediatric wards at 11 o'clock at night and saw rats in the rafters and filth on the floors, windows without screens, children wide-eyed with pain, and no Vietnamese personnel to comfort them or care for them. And I cannot believe that this suffering is made any easier by the cultural background of the sufferers.

I say that most of the officials in Saigon do not care about these stricken people; that they are more interested in maintaining their own positions of power than in helping the victims of the war; and that from the way they look upon the people outside Saigon, and the way they treat the peasants elsewhere, they have become much like the colonialists who trained them.

If Johnson insists on reciprocity, why can't Ho Chi Minh promise not to bomb New York and Chicago if we don't bomb Haiphong and Hanoi?

Along with this lack of urgency and this indifference toward the enemy and toward its own people, the government of South Vietnam is infested as well with corruption. Government jobs are bought and paid for by people seeking a return on their investments. Police accept bribes. Officials and their wives run operations in the black market. AID funds and hospital supplies are diverted into private pockets.

We now have given South Vietnam $30 million a year for refugee relief. In my many conversations with the hard-pressed American refugee personnel, it was estimated that only half of the supplies ever reach the refugee.

If negotiations are not forthcoming, or if they face a great delay, we must ask ourselves whether the gains we can achieve are worth the staggering costs we now incur. American officials I talked to in Vietnam are emphatic that we must not expect too much from the central government, and that we cannot hope for an end to our involvement for another five or ten years. It is easy to accept five to ten years in the abstract, but it becomes more difficult when years are translated into dollars—another $150 to $300 billion at the current level of spending. And I find it impossible to talk of our future in Vietnam in terms of another 50,000 to 100,000 young Americans dead.

I believe that if we cannot achieve negotiations in the very near future, we should begin immediately to moderate significantly our military activities in South Vietnam to levels more tolerable to all and more commensurate with our limited aims. Our overriding goal should be to maximize the safety and security of the Vietnamese people and our own soldiers, rather than to search out the enemy in his territory.

We can have an enormous influence over the government of South Vietnam if only we choose to use it. They know that if we were not there they would collapse. But today many of their officials believe that, because of our fear of China and of our deep concern about communist advances in Southeast Asia, we are tied to Vietnam irrevocably. As a result, I believe they feel they can act as they wish towards the war and towards their own people.

The Text of Clark Clifford's New Negotiating Offer To North Vietnam

Senator Thurmond. When you spoke of negotiating, in that case you would be willing to have a cessation of bombing. I presume that that would contemplate that they would stop their military activities, too, if we would be expected to have a cessation of bombing.

Mr. Clifford. No, that is not what I said. I do not expect them to stop their military activities. I would expect to follow the language of the President when he said that if they would agree to start negotiations promptly and not take advantage of the pause in the bombing.

Senator Thurmond. What do you mean by taking advantage if they continue their military activities?

Mr. Clifford. Their military activity will continue in South Vietnam, I assume, until there is a cease fire agreed upon. I assume that they will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions, men, to South Vietnam. I assume that we will continue to maintain our forces and support our forces during that period. So what I am suggesting is, in the language of the President, that he would insist that they not take advantage of the suspension of the bombing.

Senator Thurmond. How would you keep them from taking advantage if we had a cessation of bombing?

Mr. Clifford. There is no way to keep them from taking advantage. If they state they are going to refrain from taking advantage, and then refuse to do so, then they have not met their agreement, and the conditions for the negotiations have failed.

Senator Thurmond. And then if they did violate that, you would favor then resuming bombing, I would presume.

Mr. Clifford. I would assume we would have no alternative. —*Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, Jan. 25*

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Capturing An Enemy Spy Ship Is Hardly Piracy

(Continued from Page Three)

sillier than the voices in Congress asking us to deal with North Korea as we dealt a century and a half ago with the Barbary pirates. Piracy is the seizure of commercial vessels on the high seas for loot. The North Koreans have not been engaged in piracy. They may have mistaken the position of our spy ship when they seized it but that is hardly piracy. One who pleads the law must come into court with clean hands and ours are not clean. In any case, as Senator Mansfield said in the Senate Jan. 29, "the responses in the Barbary Wars, a century and a half away, are not necessarily the answers for a time and place when nuclear war is only seconds away." As the *Wall Street Journal* said in an editorial the same day:

> **Remember the U-22? If the U.S. government considers it necessary, and it doubtless is in the world as it is, to send a lone reconnaissance plane high over Russia, it must realize the risk and be prepared to lose the plane. The U.S. never regarded its shooting down by the Soviets as a cause of war. Exactly the same with the Pueblo. . . . If the U.S. views that kind of mission as essential, it should be prepared to accept what can happen without overreacting to the point of risking actual war.**

If Pyongyang did seize the vessel deliberately to help the North Vietnamese, they have certainly succeeded. For the impotence it dramatizes is the best possible argument for disengaging from that war.

Greece as Symbol of Our Failure

More importantly the Pueblo affair illustrates how we may be drawn into wider war without our knowledge or consent so long as we have entangled our future in these unsettled Asian civil wars. It is hard to know what is really being done in our name 10,000 miles away. It is hard to control our own armed forces and even harder to control those of our allies. A major goal of a wise foreign policy would be to disengage from them by encouraging the rise of representative regimes in place of the present military dictatorships and through these regimes moving toward reunification of these divided countries.

It is 20 years since, with the Truman Doctrine, we set out to "make the world safe for freedom" and Greece, the country whose fate was immediately at stake, is now a military dictatorship. It is 17 years since the Korean war led us to throw a protectorate over Formosa and South Korea, and 13 years since by the SEATO pact we extended this to all Southeast Asia. Everywhere we have failed. The fruits have been dictatorship and war. The Pueblo affair warns us to get out of Asia. The despairing voices of Greek democrats like Melina Mercouri and Andreas Papandreou warn us that Greece, where the Pax Americana was launched, may become Europe's first Vietnam now that American support of the dictators leaves the Greek democrats no way out but guerrilla war. Military power, military thinking, have led us to this brink. If we cannot disengage we may wake up some day and find that, like Rome, we have through the sheer weight of our military responsibilities crushed at home the freedom we destroy abroad. *Jan. 30*

The Greatest Dissenter of Them All

"And I can tell you that the President of the United States is going to dissent from polls, pickets, pundits, propaganda, and protests. . . . He is going to dissent by acting in the national interest. He is going to dissent by following the road of responsibility, no matter how many roadblocks may be placed there by people who lack maturity, good sense, courage, decency or a combination of all four."

—Lawrence F. O'Brien, Pastmaster General, speaking to the Springfield, Mass., Kiwanis Club, Jan. 12, 1968, from the Congressional Record, *Jan. 18, 1968, p. H141.*

HAT'S OFF to National Educational Television for defying Congressional bullies and broadcasting Felix Greene's moving film on North Vietnam with David Schoenbrun's brilliant colloquy about it with Prof. Robert Scalapino.

PERSONAL NOTE: For the best (and only account) of our birthday party (it was wonderful fun) see Michael C. D. Macdonald in New York's Village Voice **for Jan. 25.**

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